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Mediation has been acknowledged for many years within legal discourse 
as an effective means of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in various 
areas, such as family law, medical law, commercial law (hereafter referred 
to as traditional mediation).  However, recently - especially since the end 
of the Cold War - mediation has also been employed in an attempt to 
resolve armed conflicts and international crises1 (hereafter referred to as 
international peace mediation).  It is the aim of this paper to set forward 
the theoretical underpinnings of international peace mediation in order 
to more fully understand this conflict resolution technique, and thus 
understand how it can be more successfully employed in the future.   
 
While traditional mediation, as a form of ADR, has been 
comprehensively examined and critiqued and has been situated in a 
concrete legal framework, international peace mediation has emerged in 
the absence of such in-depth analysis and structure.  Currently, 
international peace mediation is being employed by numerous 
organisations, States and individuals but this is happening in the absence 
of a uniform and coherent conception of the meaning of international 
peace mediation.2  Worryingly, '[c]ontemporary peace mediation is a 
crowded and increasingly competitive field currently lacking established 
accountability mechanisms' and coherence.3  This article proposes that 
with such a lack of standardization and certainty, the potential of 
international peace mediation as a conflict resolution technique cannot 
be fully harnessed.  It is also proposed that the extant legal framework of 
traditional mediation should be applied to international peace mediation 
to create a more successful conflict resolution tool.   
 
Section 1 of this study focuses on how international peace mediation has 
been described and analysed in the literature of peace studies and 
amongst some international peace mediation practitioners.  It highlights 
the lack of uniformity with regard to the theoretical underpinnings of 
international peace mediation.  Section 2 sets out the current framework 
that exists within legal discourse and practice concerning the different 
categories of mediation.  The third section consists of a case study of 
                                                 
1 The Human Security Brief 2007 states that a growing number of conflicts 
are ending in 'negotiated settlements' rather than fought out until one sides 
prevails militarily and provides statistics on this trend - see Human Security 
Brief 2007, Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University, 
Canada, 2007.  The International Crisis Behavior project states that 
mediation was employed in 131 of the 447 crises which occurred around the 
world between 1918 and 2005 - See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb.  The 
definition of 'crisis' used by this project has two elements: '(1) a change in 
type and / or an increase in intensity of disruptive (i.e., hostile verbal or 
physical) interactions between two or more states, with a heightened 
probability of military hostilities that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their 
relationship and challenges the structure of an international system - global, 
dominant, or subsystem' – Brecher, M. & Wilkenfeld J. (2000) A Study of 
Crisis. 2nd ed, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 4 - 5. 
2 See Herrberg, A. (2008) 'Perceptions of International Peace Mediation in 
the EU.' Crisis Management Initiative, p. 8. 
3 Lanz, D., Wählisch, M., Kirchhoff, L. & Siegfried, M. (2008) 'Evaluating 
Peace Mediation', Initiative for Peacebuilding. 
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peace mediation in practice in the region of Aceh in Indonesia.  Section 
4 then analyses the type of mediation which was employed in Aceh and 
sets this within the framework of traditional mediation.  The article 
concludes with a discussion of why and how international peace 
mediation should be categorised as 'evaluative' mediation under the 
traditional mediation framework and how this categorisation can imbue 
international peace mediation with more certainty and structure and can 
perhaps lead to more successful employment of international peace 
mediation in the future. 
 
Literature and Data Analysis 
Information for this paper was collected from a review of relevant legal, 
conflict resolution and peace studies literature and through semi-
structured interviews undertaken with professionals involved in peace 
mediation in two organisations involved in international peace 
mediation.  This literature and interview data was then applied to a case-
study of international peace mediation in practice in Aceh.   
 
Literature 
There exists a body of literature within peace studies that examines the 
use of mediation in conflict resolution. Authors such as Touval, 
Zartman, Galtung, Bercovitch, Anagnoson, Wille, Beardsley and 
Horowitz all discuss different styles of mediation and consider the 
different roles of mediators in the conflict resolution process. However, 
despite the existence of such material, there is a lack of coherence and 
clarity in the definitions put forward by each of these authors, in terms 
of their perceptions and understanding of international peace mediation.  
This results in a lack of commonality among peace studies theorists, and 
renders it much more difficult to categorise the different types of 
mediation used. (These differences are considered in more depth below.)  
Academics within peace studies use interchangeable terminology to 
identify mediation styles that have been utilised for conflict resolution.  
Closer examination of the definitions provided demonstrates a very close 
degree of similarity in the type of mediation being deployed although this 
is not evident at first sight because different tags are attached to these 
styles. It is also apparent that the types of mediation being described 
would fit within the three specific styles of mediation that have been 
identified and are well established within the legal framework of 
traditional mediation. For these reasons, the case is put forward that the 
literature available within the area of law and alternative dispute 
resolution should be taken into account and applied to any discussion on 
the use of mediation for conflict resolution within the context of 
international peace mediation. 
 
Mediation (traditional mediation) is a long and well established 
alternative form of dispute resolution to litigation. Key advocates of 
mediation such as Fuller, Moore, Riskin, Folger, Bush, Della Noce, 
Grillo and Abel, have all evaluated the usefulness of mediation and also 
the impact of the mediator on the success or otherwise of the mediation 
process. Examination of this literature allows the researchers to explore 
whether the categorisation of mediation styles within the legal 
framework of traditional mediation is readily applicable to international 
peace mediation. Application of this material is of benefit to the 
researchers as a tacit agreement exists among mediation theorists within 
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area of law and alternative dispute resolution about the distinctive styles 
of mediation. To draw upon this particular framework would be useful 
for anyone working within the field of international peace mediation, 
particularly as this is an evolving area which is of interest to both 
academics and practitioners. 
 
Interviews 
Part of the research methodology undertaken was data collection by way 
of semi-structured interviews.  Interviews were conducted with 
personnel from two non-governmental organisations, the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) and the Crisis Management Initiative 
(CMI).  Both of these organisations were involved in the mediation 
process in Aceh. CHD were the first organisation to attempt to mediate 
the Aceh conflict but were unsuccessful in their efforts. CMI became 
involved as a consequence of Martti Ahtisaari’s engagement with this 
process. Ahtisaari was invited by the Indonesian Government to become 
involved in the negotiations between the Indonesian Government and 
the GAM. CMI was set up in 2000 by Ahtisaari.  Personnel from both 
NGOs were selected on the basis of their position within each respective 
organisation and also because of their involvement as mediators within 
the field of conflict resolution and international peace mediation.  A 
semi-structured interview was undertaken with each of the interviewees.4   
 
Section 1:  Construction of mediation within peace studies 
Before any discussion of the type of mediation that has been identified 
within the legal and ADR literature, it is necessary to discuss how 
mediation is understood within the context of peace studies.  What is 
evident is that there lacks a clear conceptual framework within peace 
studies of what international peace mediation is, and there is discord 
among theorists regarding the styles of mediation that are used in 
international peace mediation. (Notably there has been some 
acknowledgement within peace studies of the extant legal framework of 
traditional mediation and that this ought to be taken into consideration.)5 
 
Bercovitch and DeRouen provide three categories of mediation 
strategies, or styles.6  According to Bercovitch and DeRouen, each 
different mediation strategy informs the particular behavioural tactics of 
the mediators.  The first style is that of communication-facilitation 
mediation. The mediator adhering to this style will have an impartial role, 
essentially acting as a facilitator to promote communication between the 
disputing parties.  Such a mediator exerts no control or influence over 
the mediation process, acting only to ensure that the lines of 
communication are open between the parties, and to facilitate the supply 
of any necessary information.7 (The description provided of this strategy 
mirrors that of facilitative mediation as it is understood within the legal 
                                                 
4 See appendices attached for the list of interview questions used 
5 See footnote #2 in Beardsley, K., Quinn, D., Biswas, B., Wilkenfeld, J. 
(2006) “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol.50 (1), pp.58-86 at p.62. 
6 Bercovitch, J. & DeRouen, K. (2004) “Mediation in Internationalized 
Ethnic Conflicts: Assessing the Determinants of a Successful Process.” 
Armed Forces and Society, Vol.30 (2) pp.147-170. 
7 Ibid. p.156-157 
 4 
framework of traditional mediation.)  The second style defined by 
Bercovitch and DeRouen is that of procedural-formulative mediation 
strategy. The mediator who subscribes to this typology will have a more 
involved role in the mediation process, and will ‘exert more formal 
control’ over the process. The purpose of this style of mediation is to 
‘create a favourable environment’ for conducting mediation. The third 
style of mediation to be found within the context of international peace 
mediation according to Bercovitch and DeRouen is that of directive 
mediation.  With this style of mediation, the mediator goes beyond 
organising the environment. Instead the mediation who takes a directive 
approach will ‘affect the content and substance of the bargaining process 
by providing incentives for the parties and changing their motivational 
calculus’.8  Bercovitch and DeRouen submit that this type of mediator 
will actively seek to influence the parties’ expectations and behaviour, 
using a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to encourage parties to reach a 
settlement.  The descriptions of the second style of mediation, that of 
procedural-formulative mediation, and the third style of mediation, 
directive mediation, are again very similar to a type of mediation 
commonly understood as evaluative mediation within the legal 
framework of traditional mediation. 
 
The lack of uniformity within the peace studies literature regarding the 
meaning of mediation is certainly evidenced within Beardsley et al’s 
article on mediation styles deployed in conflict resolution.9 Beardsley et 
al identify three different styles of mediation, namely, facilitation, 
formulation and manipulation. In defining the facilitation style of 
mediation, Beardsley et al make a distinction between the mediator as a 
facilitator and the mediator as a communicator. There is no sense of any 
overlap between these two approaches.  Instead Beardsley et al prefer to 
adopt Bercovitch’s definition of facilitation as they believe it better 
encapsulates the functions of the mediator in trying to encourage 
communication between the parties, ultimately allowing the parties to 
determine “mutually acceptable alternatives to violent conflict”.10  The 
alternative is that the mediator acts as a communicator, a style identified 
by peace studies theorists such as Touval and Zartman.  The function of 
the mediator as a communicator is to encourage the disputing parties to 
communicate with each other.11 Beardsley et al’s description of the 
mediator as a facilitator, or the mediator as a communicator, certainly fit 
within the traditional understanding of facilitative mediation within the 
legal framework.12  Rather than distinguishing between the functions of 
the mediator as a facilitator or as a communicator, it would be better to 
draw upon the definition of facilitative mediation outlined within the 
legal literature to ensure a sense of uniformity, clarity and certainty of the 
mediator’s role and functions when this typology of facilitative mediation 
is deployed.  Beardsley et al also claim that facilitation should be included 
within any understanding of mediation within the context of 
                                                 
8 Ibid. p.157 
9 Beardsley, K., Quinn, D., Biswas, B., Wilkenfeld, J. (2006) “Mediation Style 
and Crisis Outcomes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol.50 (1), pp.58-86. 
10 Ibid. p.63 
11 Ibid. 
12 See below for further discussion on the role of the facilitative mediator 
within the legal literature. 
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international peace mediation.  Such a claim completely fails to take into 
account that mediation within the legal literature identifies facilitation as 
the original and traditional type of mediation.  
 
The second style of mediation discussed by Beardsley et al is that of 
“mediation as formulation”.13 According to this style of mediation, the 
mediator will actively contribute to negotiations between the disputing 
parties, putting forward possible solutions to the parties.  The mediator 
who adopts this particular style will intervene when a stalemate occurs 
between the parties, “redefining the issues at hand and/or proposing 
specific alternatives”.14  This style is similar to the “directive mediation” 
approach identified by Horowitz below, and also is very similar to the 
role of the evaluative mediator within the framework of traditional 
mediation. The evaluative mediator actively engages in the mediation 
process suggesting possible solutions to the disputing parties.15 
 
Beardsley et al, describe a third style of mediation, manipulative 
mediation. According to Beardsley et al, the mediator uses his, or her, 
power and influence in the mediation process. The manipulative 
mediator is very much involved in the negotiation process between the 
disputing parties, with concerted efforts being made to encourage the 
parties to reach a resolution, either by deploying a so-called “carrot and 
stick” approach.  Beardsley et al’s ‘manipulative mediation’ also fits 
within the evaluative mediation style that exists within the legal 
framework of traditional mediation. Even Beardsley et al acknowledge 
that what they call ‘manipulative mediation’ is also called ‘directive 
mediation’ by the likes of Kressel, Bercovitch and Horowitz.16  The lack 
of coherence in the description of mediation styles in international peace 
mediation simply serves to further confuse an understanding of the 
particular role and function that a mediator can have depending on the 
style of mediation adapted, and also the differences in impact that each 
style can have. 
 
The lack of commonality with the varying analyses of international peace 
mediation is evidenced within Horowitz's categorisation of mediation in 
conflict resolution processes.17  The first style of mediation that she 
identifies focuses on the mediation process with the mediator adapting 
the role of a facilitator.  The second style deals with the “resolution of 
problems”. 18  Horowitz submits that the mediator uses his, or her, 
position to influence the parties, effectively putting pressure on the 
parties to reach a resolution. This style of mediation is described as being 
“directive mediation”.19 Horowitz refers to a third style of mediation, 
which is a well established style of mediation within traditional 
mediation. The third style that she discusses is transformative mediation, 
                                                 
13 Beardsley et al (2006) p.63 
14 Beardsley et al (2006) p.63 
15 See Riskin, L. (1994) ‘Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques.’ 
Alternatives to High Cost Litigation, Vol. 12 (9), p.111. 
16 Beardsley et al (2006) p.63 
17 Horowitz, S. (2007) “Mediation.” in Webel, C. & Galtung, J. (eds) 
Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. Oxon: Routledge. 
18 Horowitz, S. (2007) p.57 
19 Horowitz, S. (2007) p.58 
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specifically the style of mediation identified by Bush and Folger in 1994.  
Horowitz deems Bush and Folger’s transformative mediation to be “a 
bridge between traditional mediation and Johan Galtung’s transcendent 
transformative mediation.”20  Horowitz focuses on the idea that there are 
two specific trends in international peace mediation, one is a less 
directive, facilitative approach, the other is a directive approach whereby 
the mediator guides and directs the parties.  The first bears more than a 
resemblance to the style of mediation commonly referred to as 
‘facilitative’ mediation within the constructs of traditional mediation. The 
second style, which Horowitz describes as “directive mediation” is also 
notably similar to the definitions of evaluative mediation within the 
context of traditional mediation.  
 
Section 2:  Current Legal Framework on Mediation 
From the discussion in Section 1 it is clear that the differing analyses of 
international peace mediation lacks consensus.  Authors employ varying 
terminology to describe the same types of mediation style, leading to 
confusion and a lack of certainty.  However, within legal discourse on 
traditional mediation a uniform, standardised framework exists.  This has 
proven to be successful in the resolution of various types of family law, 
commercial law, medical law etc. disputes.  It is therefore recommended 
that this type of framework should also be adopted within the 
international peace mediation discourse to inform its use and practice in 
conflict resolution. 
 
Mediation is traditionally perceived as a voluntary, consensual process 
whereby an independent third party assists the disputing parties to reach 
a mutually acceptable settlement.21  Fuller provides what has since been 
called the ‘deepest and most “classic” statement of what mediation is’.22 
According to Fuller, mediation is: 
 
‘…always…directed toward bringing about a more harmonious 
relationship between the parties, whether this can be achieved 
through explicit agreement, through a reciprocal acceptance of the 
“social norms” relevant to their relationship, or simply because the 
parties have been helped to a new or more perceptive understanding 
of one another’s problems.’23 
 
In its traditional format, mediation allows the disputing parties to have a 
certain degree of control over the process.24  Voluntary mediation 
                                                 
20 Horowitz, S. (2007) p.58 
21 Meschievitz, C. (1991) ‘Mediation and Medical Malpractice: Problems 
with Definition and Implementation.’ Law and Contemporary Problems, pp.195-
215 at p.198; MacFarlane, J. (1999) ‘The Mediation Alternative.’ pp.1-21 in 
MacFarlane, J. (1999) (ed.) Rethinking Disputes: The Mediation Alternative. 
London: Cavendish Publishing. 
22 Menkel-Meadow, C. (2000) ‘Mother and Fathers of Invention: The 
Intellectual Founders of ADR.’ Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, Vol. 16 
(1), pp.1-37 at p.18. 
23 Fuller, L. (1971) ‘Mediation – Its Forms and Functions.’ Southern California 
Law Review, Vol. 44, pp.305-339 at p.308. 
24 Moore, C. (1991) The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p.277; Johnson, S. (2000) ‘The Case for Medical 
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provides the parties with the opportunity to determine the parameters 
within which they must negotiate.  As the parties are not subject to the 
rules that are applicable in the legal process, mediation can allow them to 
reach an outcome that is acceptable to both.25  Mediation provides the 
disputing parties with a forum whereby they can consider their individual 
needs and how best to accommodate these.26  The commonly held view 
of mediation is that it is both flexible and informal, and as such, lends 
itself to more adequately resolving the issues between the disputing 
parties.27  The outcomes can be creative and designed specifically to deal 
with the particular needs and interests of the parties concerned.28  
Ultimately, it is the parties who have control over the outcome of the 
mediation.29 
 
The Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) defines mediation 
as ‘a flexible process conducted confidentially in which a neutral person 
actively assists parties in working towards a negotiated agreement of a 
dispute or difference, with the parties in ultimate control of the decision 
to settle and the terms of the resolution.’ 30 
 
There exist a number of mediation styles within the legal framework of 
traditional mediation.  These include facilitative mediation, evaluative 
mediation and transformative mediation.   
 
Facilitative mediation  
Facilitative mediation is the original and first identified mediation style.  
This mediation style provides a structure to ensure that parties reach a 
mutually acceptable settlement.  The role of the mediator as an impartial 
third party is to assist the parties in reaching this agreement.  The 
mediator does not suggest a suitable outcome to the parties.  Facilitative 
mediation is what is commonly understood to be mediation.  The 
                                                                                                         
Malpractice Mediation.’ Journal of Medicine and Law, Vol.5, pp.21-31 at pp.24-
25. 
25 Meschievitz, C. (1991) p.198 
26 Meschievitz, C. (1991) p.198; Folberg, J. and Taylor, A. (1984) Mediation. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p.10. 
27 Meschievitz, C. (1991) p.197; Dauer, E. and Marcus, L. (1997) ‘Adapting 
Mediation to Link Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health 
Care Quality Improvement.’ Law and Contemporary Problems, pp.185-218 at 
p.200; Bush, B. in Alfini, J., Baraki, J., Bush, R., Hermann, M., Hyman, J., 
Kovach, K., Liebman, C., Press, S., and Riskin, L. (1994) ‘What Happens 
When Mediation is Institutionalised?: To the Parties, Practitioners, and Host 
Institutions.’ Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol.9 (2), pp.307-332 at 
p.309; Delgado, R. (1997) ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution – Conflict as 
Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo.’ Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 81, 
pp.1391-1411 at p.1404; Johnson, S. (2000) pp.26-27. 
28 Dauer, E. and Marcus, L. (1997) pp.207-209; MacFarlane, J. (1999) p.16; 
Menkel-Meadow, C. (2000) p.36. 
29 Palmer, M. and Roberts, S. (1998) Dispute Processes: ADR and Primary Forms 
of Decision Making. London: Butterworths, p.104; Conneely, S. (2001) Family 
Mediation in Ireland. Dartmouth: Ashgate, p.9. 
30 Eileen Carroll, Deputy Chief Executive, CEDR, (November 2004) 
‘Redefining Mediation.’ Available at: 
http://www.cedr.co.uk/index.php?location=/library/articles/Redefining_m
ediation.htm.   
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significant features of facilitative mediation therefore are that it is 
consensual and voluntary.  As MacFarlane explains, the aim of this 
particular style of mediation is to: 
 
‘…facilitate the development of consensual solutions by the 
disputing parties…’31 
 
Facilitative mediation can foster communication between the disputing 
parties.32  Palmer and Roberts explain that facilitative mediators have a 
minimal role in the mediation process.33  The role of the facilitative 
mediator is seen as encouraging, and improving, communication 
between the disputing parties to help them reach an acceptable 
settlement.34  With facilitative mediation the parties are deemed 
competent of negotiating and determining the dispute more effectively 
themselves.  This is due to their unique insight into, and understanding 
of, the situation.35 The parties can then collaborate to solve the problem 
in a manner that will address their needs and interests.36  Thus, the 
parties can be creative in determining a suitable outcome that, as some 
commentators claim, allows for a ‘win-win’ solution to the dispute.37  
 
Evaluative mediation 
This style of mediation was first identified by Riskin.  Riskin 
acknowledges that with evaluative mediation the mediator has a much 
greater level of participation, and interaction, in the process to ensure 
that the disputing parties reach a settlement.  Unlike facilitative 
mediation, where the mediator acts as an impartial third party whose 
role, in theory at least, is not to influence the mediation process or 
outcome in any way, evaluative mediation sees the mediator being more 
involved with the process and the outcome. As Riskin explains, the 
assumption within evaluative mediation is that the parties are dependent 
upon the mediator to provide guidance regarding their circumstances 
and possible ways of resolving the dispute.38 Palmer and Roberts explain 
that the mediator will evaluate the merits of the respective parties’ 
position.39    The main strategy of the evaluative mediator is to help the 
parties appreciate the relative strengths and weaknesses of their 
                                                 
31 MacFarlane, J. (1999) p.2 
32 Johnson, S. (2000) p.27; Conneely, S. (2002) p.21 
33 Palmer, M. and Roberts, S. (1998) p.126   
34 Palmer, M. and Roberts, S. (1998) p.125; Riskin, L. (1994) p.111 
35 Riskin, L. (1994) p.111 
36 Burger, W. (1982) ‘Isn’t There a Better Way?’ American Bar Association 
Journal, Vol.68, pp.274-277; Galanter, M. (1985) ‘…A Settlement Judge, Not 
a Trial Judge: Judicial Mediation in the United States.’ Journal of Law and 
Society, Vol.12, pp.1-18. 
37 Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994) p.16  
38 Riskin, L. (1994) ‘Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques.’ 
Alternatives to High Cost Litigation, Vol. 12 (9), p.111; Riskin was the first to 
identify the features of evaluative mediation. See also Bush, R. (2002) 
‘Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Growing Market for Evaluative 
Mediation, and What it Means for the ADR Field.’ Pepperdine Dispute 
Resolution Law Journal, Vol.3, p.113. 
39 Palmer, M. and Roberts, S. (1998) p.126 
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respective positions.40  On this basis, the mediator will then put forward 
suggestions as to how the dispute can be resolved.  This may include 
details of a settlement.41  Riskin lists some of the other techniques 
deployed by the evaluative mediator.  These include persuading the 
parties to accept a settlement proposal, proposing ‘position-based 
compromise agreements’, and trying to persuade the parties to accept the 
mediator’s assessment of the merits of each party’s claim.42  Emphasis 
will be placed upon full participation of all relevant parties during the 
mediation process.  Opportunities will be available for parties to discuss 
settlements.43 Evaluative mediators will ask the parties about their 
‘situations, plans, needs and interests’.44  That the mediator focuses on 
the underlying interests as the goal of mediation distinguishes evaluative 
mediation from facilitative mediation.  The mediator may, using 
evaluative techniques, suggest settlement options other than 
compensation.  Riskin claims that the evaluative mediator will provide 
the parties with ‘predictions, assessments and recommendations’, with 
emphasis on those ‘options that address underlying interests’.45  Folger 
and Bush identify this type of mediation as the ‘problem-solving approach’, 
whereby the mediator has a very involved role in directing the parties 
towards settlement.46 
 
As the emphasis is on the underlying interests and needs of parties, this 
type of mediation style can deliver options that will accommodate 




Bush and Folger developed this concept of transformative mediation in 
the early 1990s. Menkel-Meadow, Folger and Bush are advocates of the 
transformative purpose of mediation.48  According to Bush and Folger, 
mediation can be better understood by taking into account the particular 
ideological commitments of mediators.49   
 
Folger and Bush believe that this particular style of mediation can 
transform both individuals and society because it is not focused on the 
outcome. 50  Transformative mediation focuses on empowerment and 
personal responsibility.51  This differs from evaluative and facilitative 
mediation where the focus is directed on achieving a specific outcome.  
Folger and Bush contend that when the empowerment and recognition 
                                                 
40 Riskin, L. (1994) p.111 
41 Palmer, M. and Roberts, S. (1998) p.126 
42 Riskin, L. (1994) p.111 
43 Ibid. p.112 
44 Riskin, L. (1994) p.112 
45 Ibid.  
46 Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994) p.12 
47 Riskin, L. (1994) p.112 
48 Menkel-Meadow, C. (2000); Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994)  
49 Della Noce, D. (2004) ‘From Practice to Theory: A Brief Retrospective on 
the Transformative Mediation Model.’ Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 
Vol.19, pp.925-935 at p.926. 
50 Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994)  
51 MacFarlane, J. (1999) p.13 
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effects of mediation are core to the process, that parties will use conflicts 
as ‘opportunities for moral growth’.  This is a realisation of mediation’s 
transformative potential.52  Folger and Bush provide definitions of 
empowerment and recognition: 
 
‘…empowerment means the restoration to individual’s of a sense of 
their own value and strength and their own capacity to handle life’s 
problems.  Recognition means the evocation in individuals of 
acknowledgement and empathy for the situation and problems of 
others.’53 
 
Folger and Bush make it clear that transformative mediation does not 
mean that there is no opportunity for a suitable settlement, that 
settlement is possible even if the focus of transformative mediation is on 
empowerment and recognition.54   
 
This style of mediation will mean that the mediator will have more 
involvement in the process, similar to the evaluative mediation process.  
However, the transformative mediator will not take the same directive 
approach as the evaluative mediator.  Instead of suggesting how a 
resolution could be reached, the transformative mediator will try to 
foster the empowerment dimension of mediation. This type of mediation 
can mean that the mediator’s concern is the transformative potential 
rather than on the settlement.55  According to Folger and Bush this 
involves the transformative mediators focusing on: 
 
‘…empowering parties to define issues and decide settlement 
terms for themselves and on helping the parties to better 
understand one another’s perspectives.’56 
 
As a consequence, Folger and Bush claim that this approach enables 
parties to find suitable solutions.  Transformative mediation focuses 
more on the relationship between the parties.  Essentially transformative 
mediation allows the disputing parties to reach a resolution based upon 
their interests, and in addition to this, enables them to develop a sense of 
compassion for the other party.57  Folger and Bush contend that this 
particular dimension of mediation is of ‘primary and immense’ 
importance.58   This contrasts with both facilitative and evaluative 
mediation that are outcome oriented.  Folger and Bush identify this 
feature of mediation as allowing the parties to gain a better 
understanding and appreciation of the other’s needs and interests.59  The 
benefit of transformative mediation is that it can lead to transformation 
at both an individual and societal level.60  If the ultimate objective of 
                                                 
52 Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994) p.2 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid. p.3 
55 MacFarlane, J. (1999) p.13 
56 Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994) p.12 
57 MacFarlane, J. (1999) p.20 
58 Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994) p.4 
59 Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994) p.4 
60 Ibid. p.21 and p.29 
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international peace mediation is peace within a community, then it could 
certainly be said that transformative mediation is applicable.  
 
Role of the mediator 
The mediator has a pivotal role to play in the mediation process.  The 
mediator can influence how the mediation progresses and is conducted: 
from determining when the parties can speak, to setting out possible 
solutions for settlement.61  The style of mediation adopted used will 
significantly influence the role that the mediator has in the process.  
Della Noce, Bush and Folger stress that: 
 
‘[a]s mediators interact with the parties during the course of the 
mediation process, they constantly draw upon their preferred 
theoretical frameworks… to interpret the unfolding interactions 
and to make choices about when and how to intervene based 
upon their interpretations.’62 
 
Above, descriptions have been provided of the differences between 
facilitative, evaluative and transformative mediation.  Each of these 
mediation strategies will affect the methods deployed by the mediator, 
and the particular approach of the mediator towards settlement.  
Mediators possess different goals and values, and as such, these can have 
an affect on the mediation process and outcomes.63 This will be 
significant in terms of the role of the mediator, and the impact the 
mediator will have upon the process.  Mediators adopting a facilitative 
approach will have a minimal involvement in the process.64  These 
mediators will not assess the merits of the respective parties’ case or 
make recommendations regarding possible outcomes.65  Riskin considers 
that the facilitative approach will see the mediator trying to help the 
disputing parties understand the other side’s position better.  The 
facilitative mediator will also assist the parties to ‘define, understand and 
resolve’ their specific problems and needs.66  The evaluative mediator 
will have greater involvement in the process with the emphasis upon 
determining the underlying needs and interests of the parties.  
Transformative mediation, however, does not focus on the individuals; 
rather the transformative mediator will seek to achieve the goal that will 
be most beneficial for ‘communal interests’ rather than the needs of the 
parties.67 
 
                                                 
61 Grillo, T. (1991) p.1585; Silbey, S. and Merry, S. (1986) ‘Mediator 
Settlement Strategies.’ Law and Policy, Vol.8 (1), pp.7-32 
62 Della Noce, D., Bush, R., and Folger, J. (2002-2003) ‘Clarifying the 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications for Practice and 
Policy.’ Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol.3 (39), pp.39-65 at p.42. 
63 Della Noce, D., Bush, R. and Folger, J. (2002-2003) p.46; Silbey, S. and 
Merry, S. (1986) pp.7-32 
64 Palmer, M. and Roberts, S. (1998) p.126 
65 Palmer, M. and Roberts, S. (1998) p.126; Newman, P. (1995) ‘Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) - Tomorrow's Reality or a Flash in the Pan?'  The 
Litigator, p.152. 
66 Riskin, L. (1994) p.113 
67 Palmer, M. and Roberts, S. (1998) p.110 
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Grillo states that the mediators ‘orient the parties toward reasonableness 
and compromise, rather than moral vindication’.68 Della Noce, Bush and 
Folger submit that mediators do not remain neutral, and do influence the 
mediation process.  They claim that the mediators do act ‘coercively’ 
during the mediation session to ensure that parties accept a settlement.69  
This is certainly the case when dealing with international peace 
mediation, for example within the manipulative mediation style outlined 
by Beardsley et al, the mediator will adopt a so-called ‘carrot and stick’ 
approach to either incentivise disputing parties to reach a resolution by 
offering the parties some sort of compensation agreement, or imposing 
economic or diplomatic sanctions to dissuade parties from non-
agreement.70 
 
Mediators have a significant level of power that is often overlooked.  
The mediator’s influence is very often covert. Grillo acknowledges that: 
‘[m]ediators…exert a great deal of power.  When two people are 
in conflict, having a third, purportedly neutral person take the 
viewpoint of one or the other results in a palpable shift of power 
to the party with whom the mediator agrees.  The mediator can 
also set the rules regarding who talks, when they may speak, and 
what may be said.  The power of the mediator is not always 
openly acknowledged but is hidden beneath protestations that 
the process belongs to the parties.  This can make the parties 
feel less, not more, in control of the process and its 
consequences for their lives. There is much room for, but little 
acknowledgement of, the possibility of the mediator’s exhibiting 
partiality or imposing a hidden agenda on the parties.’71 
 
Mediators have inherent biases that can affect their impartiality when 
presiding over the mediation process.72 
 
There is evidence in the literature that shows that mediators do have a 
significant influence upon settlement of disputes through mediation. In 
some instances, mediators challenge the solutions proposed by the 
parties, as they did not deem these to be the ‘optimal solutions’.73   
Mediators are willing to influence parties when they are attempting to 
reach a suitable settlement, and to suggest outcomes that the mediator 
believes to be the best option.74  This is acceptable when the style of 
mediation engaged is that of evaluative mediation, whereby the parties 
expect the mediator to evaluate the parties respective positions and to 
put forward suggestions for suitable solutions.  As mediation is a private 
and informal forum, mediators can, and do, garner a ‘broad strategic 
power’ over the conduct of the process.75  Folger and Bush explain that 
                                                 
68 Grillo, T. (1991) p.1560 
69 Della Noce, D., Bush, R. and Folger, J. (2002-2003) p.43 
70 Beardsley et al (2006) p.64 
71 Grillo, T. (1991) pp.1585-1586 
72 Ibid. pp.1585-1586; Mulcahy, L. (2001) ‘The Possibilities and Desirability 
of Mediator Neutrality – Towards an Ethic of Partiality?’ Social and Legal 
Studies, Vol.10 (4), pp.505-527. 
73 Folger, J. and Bush, R. (1994) p.37 
74 Ibid. p.39 
75 Ibid. p.22 
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this allows mediators’ biases to flourish.  It is these biases that will have 
an effect on the process and also on the outcomes and settlement 
options.76 
 
The mediator may have to take on a role that goes beyond that of an 
impartial third party.77  Mediators have a highly influential part to play. 
Stulberg goes as far to claim that the job of the mediator is to 
‘persistently and relentlessly’ ensure that the parties reach an agreement.78   
 
Section 3:  Case Study - Aceh 
Aceh (its full name is Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) lies at the northern tip 
of the island of Sumatra, with a population of 4.01 million people.79  The 
GAM, an armed separatist group representing the Acehnese people, was 
involved in a violent conflict with the Indonesian government for many 
years until 2005.  The conflict, based primarily on a claim for self-
determination and a demand for independence, raged for over a quarter.  
Aceh was the closest point of land to the epicentre of the tsunami which 
ravaged the western coast of Indonesia in December 2004.  In the 
aftermath of the tsunami and with the aid of the Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI), an international organisation dealing with peace 
mediation, headed by former Finnish leader Martti Ahtisaari, a peace deal 
was brokered in August 2005.  This 'Memorandum of Understanding'80 
was signed by the government of Indonesia and the GAM.  Previous 
peace deals in the region which had been brokered by a different 
international organisation, the Humanitarian Dialogue Centre (HDC) had 
all failed.  However, upon signing the Memorandum of Understanding, 
the GAM conceded its demand for Acehnese independence and agreed to 
settle for limited autonomy.  The peace deal has been slowly implemented 
in Aceh and the use of violence between the GAM and Indonesian 
government forces has now almost completely ceased.  However, a level 
of demand for independence from Indonesia persists in some parts of 
Aceh, with a number of outbreaks of violence in 2007 and 200881 and it 
remains to be seen if the fragile peace which has been place since 2005 
will remain intact.   
 
                                                 
76 Ibid. p.23 
77 Silbey, S. and Merry, S. (1986) pp.14-18 
78 Stulberg, J. (1987) Taking Charge/ Managing Conflict. Massachusetts: D.C. 
Heath and Co, p.105. 
79 The last census of Indonesia that was carried out in 2000 put the total 
population of Aceh at 4,010,486.  This information is available at: 
http://www.unescap.org/Stat/cos12/cos12_indonesia.pdf, last accessed 
18/05/06. 
80 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia 
and the Free Aceh Movement, available on the website of the Crisis 
Management Initiative, at 
http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/asia_tsunami/sitrep/en/, last 
accessed 23/05/06. 
81 See World Bank / Decentralisation Support Facilty, 'Aceh Conflict 
Monitoring Update 1 - 31 May 2007', available at: 
http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org/data/doc/en/regCaseStudy/aceh/
mon/Aceh%20Conflict%20Monitoring%20Update%20-
%20May%202007.pdf, last accessed 27/07/07.  See also Fabio Scarpello, 
'Bombs shake fragile Aceh peace', South China Morning Post, August 4, 2007. 
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A Brief History of Aceh 
Aceh has a long tradition of resistance to outside powers.82  At one time 
Aceh was a free and independent state and the vital trading centre in the 
north Malaysian peninsula and remained as such for 500 years.83  This 
power declined, however, due to internal dissention and eventually 
disappeared with the arrival of the colonial powers in Indonesia.84  From 
the beginning of the 16th century until the signing of the Memorandum 
of Understanding, the Acehnese people were involved in an almost 
continuous struggle for independence85 against the Netherlands, Japan 
and Indonesia at various times.86  Britain and the Netherlands became 
embroiled in a power struggle over various places in the East Indies, 
including Aceh, in their search for wealth and this power struggle 
engendered violence and conflict.87  The Netherlands invaded in 1898, 
with Major van Heutsz of the Dutch army becoming Governor of Aceh 
and much of the region was brought under Dutch control by 1904.  It is 
estimated that between 50,000 to 100,000 Acehnese were killed during the 
conflict with 1 million wounded.88 
 
 
The Creation of Indonesia 
War continued to be waged between the Dutch and the Acehnese on an 
intermittent basis until 1942 when Japan89 conquered the colonial powers 
in the Dutch East Indies.  After the Japanese surrendered to the Allies 
and the independence of the Republic of Indonesia90 was proclaimed,91  
both Britain and the Netherlands returned to the region to try to regain 
their former colonies, although the Dutch avoided Aceh on their return.  
                                                 
82 See 'A Brief History of Aceh', 7 Estafeta (2001), available at: 
http://www.etan.org/estafeta/01/winter/6aceh.htm, last accessed 
26/09/05. 
83 See Basset, D.K. (1989) 'British 'Country' Trade and Local Trade Networks 
in the Thai and Malay Straits, c. 1680 – 1770.' Modern Asian Studies, Vol.23, 
pp. 625 - 43. 
84 See Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, (2001) 'Whither Aceh?' Third World Quarterly, 
Vol.22, pp. 437 - 52, p. 438. 
85 See http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=05, last accessed 26/09/05. 
86 See 'A Brief History of Aceh', Estafeta (2001), Vol.7, available at:   
http://www.etan.org/estafeta/01/winter/6aceh.htm, last accessed 
26/09/05. 
87 See ibid. 
88 See ibid. 
89 See Colbert, E. (1972-3) 'The Road Not Taken; Decolonization and 
Independence in Indonesia and Indochina.'  Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, pp. 608 – 
28 at p. 609; Reid, A. (1975) 'The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian 
Elites:  Northern Sumatra in 1942.' The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.35, pp. 49 
- 61. 
90 The text of the Proclamation of Independence of Indonesia can be found 
at: http://www.indonesia.embassy.uz/aboutindonesia.htm, last accessed 
10/05/06. 
91 However, in a speech made around the same time as the independence of 
Indonesia was proclaimed, Sukarno included the territory from Banda Aceh 
to Ambon in the Moulaccas as falling within the jurisdiction of the Republic 
of Indonesia, see http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/PAP/afterWPC.html, 
last accessed 06/08/06. 
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Under the Linggadjati Agreement,92 the Dutch recognised Indonesian 
sovereignty over Java, Sumatra (including Aceh) and Madura.  This was 
done in the absence of any agreement on the part of the Acehnese 
people.  
 
Despite the fact that the Dutch had not occupied Aceh during their 
second colonisation, it was still included as part of the Republic of 
Indonesia in the Round Table Conference Agreements, which were 
concluded under the auspices of the United Nations.93   The Jakarta 
government then mobilised its troops in an attempt to annex Aceh.  In an 
effort to pacify the formerly independent Acehnese, the region was 
initially granted status as an autonomous province of the Republic of 
Indonesia with Teungku M. Daud Beureu'eh as its governor but it was 
amalgamated with the province of North Sumatra in 1950.94  This was not 
to the satisfaction of the Acehnese, who rebelled against Jakarta.  Aceh's 
resistance to integration into Indonesia continued until the Indonesian 
government granted Aceh 'special territory' status in 1959.95  This 
conferred autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters on 
Aceh and allowed 'a higher-than-usual official Indonesian respect for 
Islamic law and custom.'96  While this was a positive step in the view of 
the Acehnese, Jakarta still controlled Aceh's considerable natural 
resources and the Indonesian army retained a presence in the region.  In 
practice, many of the rights promised to Aceh by Jakarta never 
materialised.  Resentment grew among the Acehnese in response to these, 
and other, matters over which the Acehnese felt exploited by Jakarta.  
This resentment led to the creation of the GAM,97 the armed separatist 
group which attempted to rise up against Jakarta in a demand for 
independence.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
                                                 
92 Linggadjati Agreement, between the Government of the Netherlands and 
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, signed on 25 March 1947.  
See Colbert, E. (1972-3) 'The Road Not Taken; Decolonization and 
Independence in Indonesia and Indochina.'  Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, pp. 608 – 
28 at p. 615.  See also Sastroamidjojo, A. & Delson, R. (1949) 'The Status of 
the Republic of Indonesia in International Law.' Columbia Law Review, Vol. 49, 
pp. 344 - 61; Cheney Hyde, C. (1949) 'The Status of the Republic of 
Indonesia in International Law.' Columbia Law Review, Vol. 49, pp. 955 - 66 
and Ricklefs, M.C. (1993) A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300. 2nd ed., 
Stanford, California:  Stanford University Press, pp. 224 - 5. 
93 Priyambudi Sulistiyanto comments that 'in 1947 President Sukarno 
persuaded Aceh to join the Republic of Indonesia, promising that Aceh 
would be given autonomy within Indonesia, and allowed to implement 
Islamic law.' -  Priyambudi Sulistiyanto  (2001) 'Whither Aceh?’ Third World 
Quarterly, Vol.22, pp. 437 – 52 and pp. 438 - 9. 
94 See ibid at  p. 438. 
95See ibid, p. 438.  See also Global Security Report on Aceh, available at:   
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm, last accessed 
27/09/05. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See Schulze, K.E. (2004) The Free Aceh Movement (GAM):  Anatomy of a 
Separatist Organization. Policy Studies, Vol. 2, East-West Center Washington.  
See also Djuli, M.N. & Jereski, R. (2002-3) 'Prospects for Peace and 
Indonesia's Survival.’ Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol.9, pp. 35 - 48, pp. 41 - 
43 in relation to the type of violence used by the GAM. 
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Background to the Conflict in Aceh 
The conflict between the GAM and the Indonesian military, the Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia (TNI),98 began in earnest in the 1970s and continued 
until the Memorandum of Understanding was signed in August 2005.  
During the intervening years, the conflict was extremely violent with 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law being 
committed by both sides. 
 
The GAM was founded by Hasan di Tiro, a descendant of a prominent 
Acehnese family of Muslim clergy.  It proclaimed the independence of 
Aceh in December 1976 but di Tiro and other major players in the GAM 
were forced to leave Aceh in 1979 as the Indonesian government began 
to arrest or kill GAM members.  They fled to Sweden where an Acehnese 
government in exile was created.  Some GAM members were trained in 
Libya and returned home to recruit and train new members in the late 
1980s.  The movement garnered such broad popular support in Aceh and 
caused so much damage in their attacks that the Indonesian government 
under Suharto declared Aceh to be a Military Operational Area  / Daerah 
Operasi Militer (DOM) and launched a counter-insurgency campaign.99  
During this period various human rights abuses were carried out as part 
of military operations which encouraged the demand for Acehnese 
independence even more.100  While President Habibie lifted Aceh's DOM 
status in 1998, this did not serve to improve matters greatly.   
 
When President Habibie announced that there would be a referendum on 
the question of self-determination in Timor Leste in 1999, the GAM and 
other groups called for a referendum for Aceh.  However, the Indonesian 
government would not agree to such a demand and deployed various 
military operations, sending more troops into Aceh to counteract the 
GAM.101  Whole villages were punished in retaliation for GAM action and 
pro-referendum groups were targeted.102   
 
The GAM reorganised the village administrative apparatus.  It replaced 
village leaders and reinstituted the concept of a council of village elders 
that had operated before Aceh had been incorporated into Indonesia.  In 
some cases, the GAM was in a position to make these changes without 
much opposition due to the extent of support for the organisation.  Other 
times, however, GAM members abducted local government officials in 
order to institute changes and to bring the local government system under 
                                                 
98 See Rieffel, L. (2004) 'Indonesia's Quiet Revolution.' Foreign Affairs, Vol.83, 
pp. 98 - 110, pp. 104 - 6 in relation to the military in Indonesia.  For a 
discussion on the role of the police in Indonesia see Meliala, A. (2001) 'Police 
as military:  Indonesia's experience.'  Policing: An International Journal of Police 
Strategies and Management, Vol.24, pp. 420 - 31. 
99 See 'A Brief History of Aceh', 7 Estafeta (2001), available at:   
http://www.etan.org/estafeta/01/winter/6aceh.htm, last accessed 
26/09/05.  See also, 'The structure of military abuse.' Inside Indonesia, No. 62, 
April - June 1999, available at:  
http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit62/dom2.htm, last accessed 08/11/05. 
100 See Human Rights Watch Report, (August 2001) 'Indonesia:  The War in 
Aceh.' Volume 13 (4) (C), p. 8. 
101 Ibid, p.10.  
102 See ibid. 
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the group's control.103  It began to impose 'war taxes' on individuals and 
on businesses, from which it gained a valuable source of income.104   
 
Peace Negotiations in Aceh 
In the middle of 2000, a conflict resolution organisation based in 
Geneva, the Henri Dunant Centre, later renamed the Humanitarian 
Dialogue Centre (HDC), succeeded in brokering a temporary peace deal 
between the GAM and the Indonesian government.  It had been 
approached in November 1999 by Indonesian President Abdurraham 
Wahid, with a view to employing its good offices to attempt to bring 
peace to Aceh.105  At this time, the majority of the Indonesian 
government was not in favour of entering into talks with the GAM, 
fearing that this type of recognition would confer legitimacy on the 
group and therefore the role of HDC was not made public. The HDC 
was deemed to be an acceptable organisation to mediate a potential 
peace deal with the GAM as it was small, neutral and non-governmental.  
The Indonesian government did not want any interference from the UN 
in the peace talks as they did not want to internationalise the conflict, 106 
as had happened previously with UN intervention in Timor Leste.  The 
HDC was originally invited to participate in peace talks as facilitators, 
however, as the talks progressed, representatives from the Centre began 
to take on the mantle of mediators.107  
 
The 'Humanitarian Pause' Agreement and the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement 
The first temporary peace deal brokered by the HDC was the Joint 
Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh (Humanitarian Pause).  
Finalised in May 2000, it was designed to last for a period of three months 
and was signed by Dr. Hassan Wirajuda of Indonesia and Dr. Zaini 
Abdullah of the GAM.108  It was not quite a cease-fire but it allowed 
negotiations between the two parties to the conflict to proceed and for 
humanitarian aid to be delivered in the region.  Committees were set up in 
Aceh, consisting of members of the GAM and representatives of the 
Indonesian government to discuss security issues.  The pause allowed for 
a dissipation of violence for a few months.  However, violations of the 
pause by the Indonesian government soon prompted retaliation from the 
GAM on the military and the police.  The Indonesian army was very 
dissatisfied with the pause and viewed it as an opportunity for the GAM 
to copper-fasten its control over the rural areas of Aceh.  The pause was 
renewed twice and was renamed 'moratorium on violence' and 'peace 
                                                 
103 See ibid, p. 10. This states:  'Sometimes through persuasion, sometimes 
through abduction and a kind of reeducation of local government officials, 
GAM gradually took control over most governmental functions from the 
district level down in wide swathes of districts...' 
104 See ibid.  
105 Kivimaki, T. & Gorman, D. (2007) Non-Governmental Actors in Peace 
Processes – The Case of Aceh. Switzerland:Henri Dunant Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, p. 8. 
106 Ibid. p. 9 
107 Ibid. p.13 
108 Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh, 12th May 2000. 
Available at          < 
http://www.hdcentre.org/files/JoU%20FINAL.pdf> 
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through dialogue', but retained its basic purpose of providing a platform 
for discussion between the GAM and the Indonesian government.109 
 
However, in March 2001, Indonesia's Defence Minister and the 
Commander of the Armed Forces announced the beginning of new 
military operations against the GAM and more troops were deployed into 
Aceh.  One of the reasons for the increase in troops was to protect the 
region's biggest investor, Exxon Mobil.  Exxon Mobil had closed three of 
its gasfields in North Aceh as a result of attacks by the GAM on its 
employees.110  The extra military presence in the region was intended to 
assure the company that its workers would not be attacked by the GAM 
and that they could safely resume normal work.111  However, Human 
Rights Watch comment that '[m]any in Aceh believed the army was using 
the closure of the gasfield as a pretext to start a long-planned offensive.'112  
President Wahid then issued Presidential Instruction (Impres) No. 4 of 
2001113 which stated that attempts to resolve the conflict with the 'armed 
separatists' and that the government had decided to respond to the 
situation with 'a more comprehensive approach, and to address the 
political, economic, social, law and order, security and information and 
communication aspects of the problem.'114  In order to achieve these 
goals, the government devised a structure of people responsible for the 
implementation of the new approach.  The security structure in Aceh was 
reorganised and an 'Operation of Security and Upholding the Law' 
(Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum / OKPH) was 
initiated.   
 
The new troops deployed for this operation set about targeting GAM 
facilities.  However, it was claimed that many civilians were also killed in 
the process.115  The conflict between the GAM and the central 
government continued in 2002.  In April of that year GAM leaders 
announced that the Indonesian offer of 'special autonomy' for Aceh was 
inadequate and once again began to demand full independence.116  In late 
July the government planned to send in thousands of extra troops in an 
attempt to finally crush the GAM and Minister Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono even put forward the idea of imposing a state of civil 
emergency in Aceh.  However, these plans came under attack amid fears 
that they would exacerbate the situation.117    
                                                 
109 See Human Rights Watch Report (August 2001) 'Indonesia:  The War in 
Aceh.' Volume 13 (4) (C), p. 10 
110 See ibid.  
111 Exxon Mobil re-opened two of the gasfields in early August 2001 but with 
a reduced production rate -  see ibid.  
112 Ibid.  
113 Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Instruksi President Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 4 Tahum 2001 Tentang Langkah-Langkah Komprehensif 
Dalam Rangka Penyelesaian Masalah Aceh.' http:www.dfa-deplu.go.id, April 
20, 2001 - see Human Rights Watch Report, (August 2001) 'Indonesia:  The 
War in Aceh.' Volume 13 (4) (C), p.11.  
114 Ibid.  
115 See ibid at p. 11.  
116 See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm, last 
accessed 27/09/05. 
117 See ibid. 
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Foreign observers came to Aceh in mid-November 2002 in order to 
monitor the situation and try to broker a peace plan between the two 
sides.  The GAM pronounced that it approved the peace plan in principle 
but wanted a withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the region before it 
would begin talks.  The withdrawal of troops did not come to pass but a 
peace plan was eventually brokered by Switzerland's HDC,118 the 
organisation responsible for the Humanitarian Pause in 2000.  The plan 
offered more autonomy for Aceh, elections for a provincial legislature 
and administration and demanded a complete cessation of violence.119  
This peace agreement, a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,120 was signed 
by both the Indonesian government and GAM leaders in December 
2002, but it was not a major success.  The main problem was that of the 
GAM's demand for independence from Indonesia.  While the 
government was willing to grant considerable autonomy to Aceh in 
principle, the GAM stated that it would be happy with nothing less than a 
complete break from Indonesian rule. 
 
By mid-May 2003, the peace deal seemed unsalvageable.  Government 
officials and GAM leaders met in Tokyo for negotiations but no 
agreement was forthcoming.  President Sukarnoputri declared a six-
month period of martial law in May and the Indonesian army launched an 
offensive involving the deployment of 35,000 troops into Aceh the 
following day.  There was violence and casualties on both sides and the 
Indonesian Red Cross reported that 12 civilians were also killed.121   
 
In May 2004 the situation in Aceh was reclassified by the Indonesian 
government as a 'civil emergency'.  The government claimed to have had 
considerable success during the period of martial law in crushing the 
GAM and claimed that thousands of GAM members had been killed, 
captured or had surrendered to the army.  However, '[c]ritics of the 
military operation countered that most of those killed were civilians, and 
say the heart of the...GAM is still relatively untouched.'122 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding  
On 26 December 2004, a powerful tsunami hit and devastated Aceh and 
many other surrounding areas.  More than 170,000 people were killed and 
another 400,000 people were left homeless by the disaster.123  In the 
                                                 
118 The organisation's official website is to be found at:  
http://www.hdcentre.org. 
119 Http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm, accessed 
27/09/05. 
120 The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement is available at: 
http://www.hdcentre.org/index.php?aid=43, accessed 27/09/05. 
121 Http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm, accessed 
27/09/05.  See also Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (September 2003) 
'Aceh under Martial Law:  Unnecessary and Dangerous Restrictions on 
International Humanitarian Access.' 
122 Http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm, last 
accessed 27/09/05. 
123 See 'After 29 years, an Aceh peace pact.' Christian Science Monitor, available 
at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0718/p06s02-woap.htm, last accessed 
30 August 2005. 
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immediate aftermath of the tsunami sporadic violence between members 
of the GAM and the Indonesian security forces continued.  It was 
reported that on the day after the tsunami the Indonesian forces launched 
military operations that killed 4 GAM members.124  However, the tragedy 
did in fact prompt the conflicting parties to return to negotiations for a 
peace plan and in January 2005 representatives of the GAM and of the 
Indonesian government met in Helsinki for discussions.  These talks were 
held under the auspices of the CMI, an independent non-governmental 
organisation concerned with response to challenges in sustainable 
security,125 which had been contacted the previous year about the 
possibility of becoming involved in the peace talks in Aceh.  It was not 
until the tsunami hit that all actors involved in the conflict showed willing 
to participate in more talks.  From January 17 to 19 2005, former 
president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, chaired a meeting between the 
GAM and the Indonesian government.  These talks were positive and 
other meetings between the two groups ensued in the following months.  
One of the main reasons why the talks were successful was the 
abandonment - albeit temporarily, according to some sources - of the 
GAM's demand for independence.  The CMI prepared a draft 
Memorandum of Understanding which was eventually signed on 15 
August 2005.  This document126 begins as follows: 
 The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM)  confirm their commitment to a peaceful, 
comprehensive and sustainable  solution to the conflict in Aceh with 
dignity for all. 
 
 The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within 
which the  government of the Acehnese people can be manifested 
through a fair and  democratic process within the unitary state and 
constitution of the  Republic of  Indonesia. 
 
 The parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful 
settlement of the  conflict will enable the rebuilding of Aceh after 
the tsunami disaster on 26  December 2004 to progress and 
succeed. 
 
 The parties to the conflict commit themselves to building mutual 
 confidence  and trust. 
 
 This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) details the 
agreement and the  principles that will guide the transformation 
process. 
 
It is clear that such a document would have been impossible to agree 
upon if the GAM had not conceded on the issue of independence.  It is 
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also questionable whether such a concession would have been made had 
it not been for the tsunami.  When asked why the Helsinki negotiations 
succeeded where all other ones had failed, GAM Prime Minister, Malik 
Mahmud commented: 
 Aceh had been in a conflict situation, but with the tsunami...we 
saw that indeed the people of Aceh really needed peace.  We took this 
opportunity to  pursue peace negotiations.  Also, at that time the 
international community  came in throngs to Aceh go give humanitarian 
assistance and help reconstruct  Aceh.  There was a very strong voice in 
the international community that  this was the time to continue 
negotiations.  They were very supportive.  I presume they also monitored 
the progress of the previous negotiations that collapsed, but this time, 
everyone was very  sympathetic with Aceh.  While helping tsunami 
victims, they urged and supported this peace initiative.127 
 
However, when asked why the GAM had dropped the demand for 
independence, Mahmud replied that it was a change in the attitude of the 
Indonesian government in relation to Aceh more than anything else that 
was the impetus for this concession: 
 First of all, we have to understand why Aceh wanted 
independence.  The  policy of previous governments was that they 
didn't want Aceh to get  independence and at the same time they 
imposed a system that was not  acceptable to Acehnese, and this caused 
many problems.  Under the new  government, we saw that this had 
changed.  They were more flexible on  that  point and of course we 
responded.  If Aceh can get what it wants  peacefully without separating 
itself from Indonesia, why should we go to war?  So, that is what I said at 
the time, that we had the right people at the  right time  and the right 
place to achieve peace.128 
 
This statement seems to be quite a drastic departure from the earlier 
stance of the GAM in relation to the demand for independence, even in 
contrast to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and it is uncertain if 
this is the real view of all of the members of the GAM who had for many 
years demanded nothing short of independence from Indonesia. 
  
The Memorandum itself contains various provisions regarding the 
governance of Aceh and it foresaw the adoption of new legislation on 
governing the region.  This law, the Law on Governing Aceh, Law No. 
11/2006, was passed on July 11 2006, after some delays.129  However, it 
has been claimed that this piece of legislation is, in fact, in violation of the 
Memorandum of Understanding.  It is claimed that while the law was 
intended to give greater autonomy to Aceh, that it allows for a 
considerable level of interference from Jakarta.  Among the most 
contentious issues in the law is the fact that Article 11 gives the 
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Indonesian government a monitoring role of all affairs of the Acehnese 
regional administration.  Another controversial issue is that under Article 
160 the management of the oil and gas resources in Aceh is to be 
undertaken both by the regional administration and the central 
government, and not the Acehnese alone.130  However, the law did 
address some of the issues which had been a cause of dissatisfaction for 
the Acehnese people and which had been highlighted in the GAM 
struggle for many years, such as the implementation of Shariah law131 and 
the creation of a Human Rights Court.   
 
The Current Situation in Aceh132 
At the moment the peace process in Aceh is working 'beyond all 
expectations.'133  Members of the GAM have willingly given in the 
number of weapons required under the terms of the Memorandum of 
Understanding and the armed wing of the organisation has been 
dissolved.  On the other side, the Indonesian army has withdrawn troops 
from Aceh in accordance with the agreement.  The release of amnestied 
GAM prisoners also seems to have gone smoothly.134  However, there 
have been number of instances of violence in the region in 2007 and 
2008, attributed to independence groups.135 
 
Voting took place in Aceh on December 11 2006 to elect the heads of the 
province and its districts.  These were the first elections ever to directly 
elect the rulers - the governor and vice-governor - of Aceh.  Previously, 
these positions had been filled by the central Indonesian government.  
Irwandi Yusuf, the leader of the 'young Turks'136 within the GAM, was 
elected governor and was sworn in on 8 February 2007.  Irwandi had 
originally graduated as a veterinary surgeon but had travelled to South 
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America and trained in the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare.137  
When he returned home he entered the GAM military central command.  
He was arrested in 2003 in Jakarta and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment 
for treason.  This sentence was increased to 9 years on appeal.  He began 
working behind the scenes in the peace talks on the Memorandum of 
Understanding when the prison in which he was being kept flooded as a 
result of the tsunami.138   
 
The elections were an important victory for the GAM.  Irwandi and his 
running mate Muhammad Nazar won 38% of the vote.  A rival GAM 
duo came second with 17%.   In the elections for district executives in 19 
out of the 21 districts in Aceh, GAM won in 8 of the districts.  Not all 
areas of Aceh have very strong GAM support.  In fact in some areas, in 
the south and southwest, local leaders have been calling for separation 
from Aceh and the establishment of new provinces.139  However, the 
strength of support for the GAM as evidenced in the election results was 
taken as a worrying sign by some, who believed that the GAM would 
return to its independence demands.  Hillman comments: 
 Some in Jakarta are worried that GAM will build on its political 
victories  to  continue its struggle for independence.  Mr. Irwandi will 
have to show Jakarta that GAM is serious about working within the new 
autonomy  framework.  Giving post-election interviews in front of a 
GAM flag, as  he has done, offends the spirit if not the letter of the peace 
deal.140 
 
Irwandi has also promised to renegotiate the Law on Governing Aceh, to 
properly reflect the original agreements made by the GAM and the 
government of Indonesia in the Memorandum of Understanding.141  
However, for some, Irwandi's moves do not go far enough and he will 
have to deal with continued demands for the independence of Aceh.  The 
Preparatory Committee of the Free Acheh Democratic142 issued a press 
release on 15 January 2006.  This is in the form of a Declaration to the 
nation of Aceh, the 'nations in the world and international institutions'.  It 
states: 
 We, the Preparatory Committee of the Free Acheh Democratic, 
would like to declare that we will continue our struggle for broader 
democratic environment in our ancestral land with respect for 
international laws. 
It goes on to state that the peace process and the Memorandum of 
Understanding are 'politically and democratically unsounded [sic.], morally 
unjustifiable, and therefore, in the longer term unsustainable' and that the 
group, who are 'loyal to the struggle for an independent nation state have 
decided to unite and establish this Committee for the following purposes:  
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to continue our struggle for independence; to reclaim the Achenese state 
and its sovereignty; to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a 
democratic and free government in Acheh and to provide the voice for 
the many Achenese voices that have been left unheard.'  The Declaration 
was signed in New York by 25 members of the Preparatory Committee of 
the Free Acheh Democratic, based in various places, including Aceh, the 
US, Sweden, Norway and Malaysia.143 
An Analysis of the Peace Deals in Aceh 
It is clear that the peace process in Aceh was complex and complicated.  
While the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and its precursors 
succeeded in opening up channels of communication between the GAM 
and the government, they failed to bring about a lasting peace in Aceh.  
Numerous reasons have been given for the failure of the Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement, such as uncertainty concerning the meaning of its 
detailed provisions (GAM did not feel that it had given up its 
independence demand whereas the Indonesian government felt this was 
implied in the agreement), a weak enforcement mechanism (the Joint 
Security Council could investigate violations of the agreement but only 
had the power make recommendations as to what should be done, which 
were rejected by the GAM and the Indonesian government144) and a lack 
of agreement within the GAM and the Indonesian government.   
 
On the surface, the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding 
seem to give Aceh a lot of powers; however in reality, most of these 
powers merely repeat or reinforce provisions already contained in the 
Special Autonomy law and a few other laws passed on Aceh.145 There are 
however, new additions, including the right to set interest rates differing 
from those of the Central Bank and the requirement that any national 
laws with the potential to affect Aceh must be approved by the province's 
legislature.  
 
One big difference between the Memorandum and previous agreements, 
such as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, is the provision allowing 
for local political parties. This issue represents one of the major 
concessions of the Indonesian government, comparable to the GAM's 
abandonment of its demand for independence.146  As mentioned it is 
doubtful whether the GAM would have conceded on its demand for 
independence if the tsunami had not devastated the region.  However, 
independence was never up for discussion in the peace talks mediated by 
Ahtisaari.147 
 
The Memorandum also allows for a much stronger monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism than the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, 
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establishing the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) which was assigned a 
broad range of duties. Whereas the HDC lacked the sufficient political 
authority to enforce their decisions on violations of the agreement under 
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Ahtisaari was in a strong position 
when mediating the Memorandum of Understanding and was able to get 
the support of the EU to monitor the implementation of this 
instrument.148 Violations of the Memorandum of Understanding are 
settled by the impartial AMM, whose ruling is binding on both parties. 
The CMI saw the design of a much stronger monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism than had been incorporated into the Cessation 
of Hostilities Agreement as one of their greatest and most important 
challenges, with Ahtisaari himself stating that NGOs should not be 
responsible for monitoring peace agreements.149 This led to the ASEAN 
states and the EU becoming part of the AMM.  
 
Section 4:  Applying the Legal Framework on Mediation to Aceh 
In this section an evaluation will be undertaken of the role of the 
mediator and the mediation style employed in the international peace 
mediation process in Aceh. The role and influence of President Ahtisaari 
as a mediator have been acknowledged as a significant factor in the 
success of this process.150  Analysis of Ahtisaari’s particular role reveals 
that his mediation style echoes that of the role of the evaluative mediator 
within traditional mediation. From the literature discussed above, Riskin 
identifies the ability to persuade parties to accept a settlement as a 
particular characteristic of the evaluative mediator.  This is certainly true 
of Ahtisaari during the Aceh peace process, who perceived: 
 
“his role as largely persuading GAM to explore ‘a narrow 
opening in the autonomy clause’… to encourage the movement 
to bend to the government’s position…”151 
 
Ahtisaari was very much involved in the negotiations between the GOI 
and GAM, making concerted efforts to direct the parties toward 
settlement, to the extent of setting out a strict timeframe which was 
rigidly adhered to.152 Not only did Ahtisaari direct the parties towards 
settlement, he intervened to remind the parties that they had to move 
forward in terms of the negotiation process instead of dwelling on the 
past.153   
 
An evaluative mediator will suggest settlement options to the disputing 
parties. Again Ahtisaari demonstrates traits of an evaluative mediator as 
he intervened during the negotiation process, especially on human rights 
issues, and included a human rights court (which the GAM sought at 
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earlier stages in the negotiation process) in the final draft of the 
agreement.154 
 
Ahtisaari also put pressure on the parties to continually move the peace 
process forward, insisting that the parties focus on the key issues, but 
not allowing the parties to use the negotiation process to thrash out the 
finer details of those issues, as Ahtisaari believed that to allow the parties 
to do so would prevent the parties from ever reaching a mutually 
acceptable settlement.155  Again the tactics adopted by Ahtisaari as a 
mediator demonstrate that his particular style is that of an evaluative 
mediator.  Even his insistence that both parties had to fully participate in 
the process is a characteristic pertinent to the evaluative mediation style.  
Ahtisaari was of the view that an agreement could deal with all of the 
parties issues and concerns, and that it required the parties to both 




From the above discussion it can be seen that a concrete framework of 
mediation has existed and been successfully employed for many years in 
traditional mediation within legal discourse.  However, it seems to be the 
case that scholars engaged in analysing international peace mediation 
have, to a large extent, ignored the extant legal structure and have 
attempted to 'reinvent the wheel' outside the legal framework, creating 
new terms to describe different approaches in mediation in a conflict 
resolution context.  This move away from law has not improved the 
understanding or conceptualisation of international peace mediation to 
any degree.  Indeed, it can be said that the sidelining of law has in fact 
hampered the study and analysis of this conflict resolution technique as 
multifarious definitions and conceptions of international peace 
mediation have been proffered, making it impossible to create a coherent 
framework.  It is therefore recommended that the legal framework of 
traditional mediation be employed in future analyses of international 
peace mediation.  In this way the effectiveness of international peace 
mediation can be assessed in a more comprehensive and efficient 
manner, against an established and coherent framework.  It is hoped that 
such an analysis would inform the development of best practice of 
international peace mediation on the ground and ensure that 
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